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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
Lisa Folajtar asks us to decide whether Congress may 
prohibit individuals convicted of federal tax fraud from 
possessing firearms.  To answer this question, we rely on the 
general rule that laws restricting firearm possession by 
convicted felons are valid.  Because we find no reason to 
deviate from this longstanding prohibition in the context of tax 
fraud, we reject Folajtar’s as-applied constitutional challenge. 
 
Folajtar pled guilty in 2011 to a federal felony: willfully 
making a materially false statement on her tax returns, which 
is punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment and a fine up 
to $100,000.  26 U.S.C. § 7206(1).1  The Court was more 
 
1 Section 7206 is titled “[f]raud and false statements,” and § 
7206(1) is titled “[d]eclaration under penalties of perjury.”  
We colloquially refer to any offense under § 7206, including 
§ 7206(1), as criminal tax fraud.  See Ray A. Knight & Lee G. 
Knight, Criminal Tax Fraud:  An Analytical Review, 57 Mo. 
L. Rev. 175, 179 (1992); see also Kawashima v. Holder, 565 
U.S. 478, 483–84 (2012) (explaining that although § 7206(1) 
does not include fraud as a formal element, it qualifies under 
the Immigration and Nationality Act as a deportable offense 
involving fraud or deceit); United States v. Taylor, 574 F.2d 
232, 234 (5th Cir. 1978) (“Section 7206(1) is a fraud 




lenient, sentencing her to three-years’ probation, including 
three months of home confinement, a $10,000 fine, and a $100 
assessment.  She also paid the IRS over $250,000 in back taxes, 
penalties, and interest.  Folajtar’s conviction left her subject to 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits those convicted of a 
crime punishable by more than one year in prison2 from 
possessing firearms.3  Congress enacted the prohibition in the 
1960s, thus expanding substantially a 1938 ban prohibiting 
 
2 Because the charge associated with § 922(g)(1) is a “felon in 
possession of a firearm,” some refer to any crime subject to § 
922(g)(1) as a felony.  When we use the term “felony,” we are 
typically referring to offenses labeled as a felony by Congress 
or the relevant state legislature.  The federal definition of a 
felony is “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year.”  18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 3559(a).  States 
vary in their definition of a felony.  Section 922(g)(1) applies 
to federal felonies and state convictions (regardless of label) 
that satisfy the federal definition of a felony, although it 
excludes state misdemeanors punishable by a term of 
imprisonment of two years or less.  See id. §§ 921(g)(1), 
921(a)(20)(B). 
 
3 Section 922(g)(1) is part of a statutory scheme that also bars 
eight other groups of persons from possessing guns, including 
fugitives, drug addicts, persons previously committed to 
mental institutions, persons under a court order prohibiting 
them from threatening a partner or child, those with  
misdemeanors or convictions for crimes of domestic violence, 
undocumented or non-immigrant aliens, persons dishonorably 
discharged from the military, and persons who have renounced 




those convicted of “crimes of violence”4 from receiving a 
firearm.  See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. IV, § 925, 82 Stat. 197, 233–34; 
id. at tit. VII § 1202, 82 Stat. at 236 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1)).    
    
In 2018, Folajtar filed a lawsuit in the District Court 
asserting that applying § 922(g)(1) to her violated her Second 
Amendment right to possess firearms.  The Government 
moved to dismiss Folajtar’s suit, arguing that, “[b]ecause 
Folajtar pleaded guilty to a federal felony, she is categorically 
excluded from the class of citizens entitled to possess a 
firearm.”  App. Vol. II, 26.  Applying our precedents in United 
States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010), and 
Binderup v. Attorney General, 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (en 
banc), the District Court determined that Folajtar did not state 
a plausible Second Amendment claim because she was 
convicted of a serious crime.  She appeals to us. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over Folajtar’s 
constitutional challenge under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over the dismissal of Folajtar’s complaint under 
Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 
224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008).  Consistent with our precedents, we 
hold that the legislature’s designation of an offense as a felony 
 
4 The statute in 1938 defined “crime of violence” as murder, 
manslaughter, rape, mayhem, kidnapping, burglary, 
housebreaking and various types of aggravated assault.  See 





is generally conclusive in determining whether that offense is 
serious.  Because we determine the felony here is a serious 
crime, Folajtar is not protected by the Second Amendment, and 
her as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) fails. 
 
A. Those who commit serious crimes are excluded 
from the Second Amendment’s protections. 
 
The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated 
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right 
of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”  
U.S. Const. amend. II.  In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570 (2008), the Supreme Court interpreted the 
Amendment’s right to bear arms as an individual right, at least 
for the core purpose of allowing “law-abiding, responsible 
citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”  Id. at 635.   
 
But that right “is not unlimited.”  Id. at 626.  Heller “did 
not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as 
‘prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.’”  
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) 
(quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27).  To the contrary, among 
the many “presumptively lawful regulatory measures” that it 
identified in Heller, the Court included “longstanding 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the 
mentally ill, . . . laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in 
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, 
[and] laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the 
commercial sale of arms.”5  Id. at 626–27; see also Doe v. 
 
5 While in a footnote Heller characterized this list of 




Governor of Pennsylvania, 977 F.3d. 270, 274 (3d Cir. 2020) 
(“We have consistently hewed to the exceptions that Heller 
preserved.”).  Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
endorsed the constitutionality of measures prohibiting firearm 
possession by felons after Heller.  See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 
786 (“We repeat [Heller’s] assurances here.”); see also New 
York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 140 
S. Ct. 1525, 1540–41 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (recognizing 
historical support for constitutionality of banning firearm 
possession by felons); Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257, 271 
(2012) (referencing Heller’s approval of laws prohibiting 
felons from having arms). 
 
Since Heller, we, along with every court to consider the 
issue, have rejected challenges that § 922(g)(1) on its face 
violates the Second Amendment.  See United States v. Barton, 
633 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds 
by Binderup, 836 F.3d at 349; see also United States v. Bogle, 
717 F.3d 281, 281–82 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); Schrader v. 
Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 991 (D.C. Cir. 2013); United States v. 
Moore, 666 F.3d 313, 318 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Joos, 638 F.3d 581, 586 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 770–71 (11th Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010); United 
 
U.S. at 627 n.26, McDonald reaffirmed the constitutionality of 
these “regulatory measures” without any qualifying language, 
561 U.S. at 786.  We understand Heller’s presumption 
language as leaving open the possibility that a truly exceptional 
“felony” may fall outside the scope of the historical bar and 




States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010); United 
States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir. 2009); 
United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009); 
cf. United States v. Carey, 602 F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(“Because Congress’s prohibition on felon possession of 
firearms is constitutional, it follows that the burdens associated 
with the congressionally-created expungement exception in 18 
U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) do not violate the Second Amendment.”).  
Thus § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as written. 
 
We do, however, permit Second Amendment 
challenges to § 922(g)(1) as applied to individuals, Barton, 633 
F.3d at 172–73, which we analyze using a two-pronged 
approach first announced in Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89.  See 
Holloway v. Att’y Gen., 948 F.3d 164, 171 (3d Cir. 2020); 
Binderup, 836 F.3d at 356.  First, the challenger bears the 
burden of showing that the law hampers “conduct falling 
within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.”  
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89.  Over time we have refined this 
prong to require the challenger to “(1) identify the traditional 
justifications for excluding from Second Amendment 
protections the class of which [she] appears to be a member, 
and then (2) present facts about [her]self and [her] background 
that distinguish [her] circumstances from those of persons in 
the historically barred class.”  Binderup, 836 F.3d at 347 (citing 
Barton, 633 F.3d at 173–74).  If the challenger cannot meet her 
burden at Step One—i.e., she cannot distinguish herself from 
the historically barred class—our inquiry is complete and her 
challenge fails.  But if the challenger can distinguish herself, 
we continue to Step Two, with the burden shifting to the 
Government to show that the law can survive heightened 




Until now we have not had to decide whether 
§ 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to a felony 
conviction.  However, we have twice considered whether the 
provision is unconstitutional as applied to state misdemeanor 
convictions.  See Holloway, 948 F.3d 164; Binderup, 836 F.3d 
336.  As noted, we typically would proceed under the first step 
of Marzzarella to determine: (1) whether persons with felony 
convictions fall within the historical class of those barred from 
Second Amendment protection; and (2) whether Folajtar, as 
one convicted of a federal tax fraud felony, can distinguish 
herself from that class.  As we explain below, our precedents 
instruct we can collapse these two questions into one:  Has the 
plaintiff overcome the generally conclusive rule that a felony 
conviction is serious, so that it falls outside the historical class 
of offenses that render felons excluded from Second 
Amendment protections?   
 
 In looking to the historical justification for limiting the 
right to bear arms, we have recognized that many scholars 
agreed that “the right to bear arms was tied to the concept of a 
virtuous citizenry[;] . . . accordingly, the government could 
disarm ‘unvirtuous citizens.’”  Binderup, 836 F.3d at 348 
(citation omitted); see also Vongxay, 594 F.3d at 1118.  Also, 
“[s]everal of our sister circuits endorse[d] the ‘virtuous citizen’ 
justification for excluding felons and felon-equivalents from 
the Second Amendment’s ambit.”  Binderup, 836 F.3d at 348 
(collecting cases).  We reasoned that people who committed or 
were likely to commit violent offenses “undoubtedly qualify as 
‘unvirtuous citizens’ who lack Second Amendment rights.”  Id.  
Further, citing Heller’s “longstanding prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons,” we concluded that “[t]he 
category of ‘unvirtuous citizens’ is thus broader than violent 
criminals; it covers any person who has committed a serious 
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criminal offense, violent or nonviolent.”  Id. (citing Heller, 554 
U.S. at 626).   
 
Accordingly, we held that “persons who have 
committed serious crimes forfeit the right to possess firearms 
much the way they ‘forfeit other civil liberties, including 
fundamental constitutional rights [e.g., the right to vote].’”  Id. 
at 349 (quoting Barton, 633 F.3d at 175).  While our dissenting 
colleague and Folajtar attempt to define the category of those 
excluded from Second Amendment protection solely by 
“dangerousness,” we made clear in Binderup that the exclusion 
applies to all serious crimes, and there ten judges agreed that 
“the correct test at step one for challenges to § 922(g)(1) is 
whether the offense is ‘serious,’ not whether the offense is 
violent.”  Holloway, 948 F.3d at 171 n.7.  When examining the 
seriousness of a crime, we “presume the judgment of the 
legislature is correct and treat any crime subject to § 922(g)(1) 
as disqualifying unless there is a strong reason to do 
otherwise.”  Binderup, 836 F.3d at 351.     
    
B. Our precedents explain that the legislature’s 
designation of an offense as a felony is generally 
conclusive when evaluating seriousness. 
 
There are “no fixed criteria for determining whether 
crimes are serious enough to destroy Second Amendment 
rights.”  Id.  In Binderup, where we held that § 922(g)(1) was 
unconstitutional as applied to a challenger convicted of the 
state misdemeanor of corrupting a minor (a consensual sexual 
relationship with a 17 year old employee) and another who 
unlawfully carried a handgun without a license, we observed 
that the legislatures classified the challengers’ offenses as 
misdemeanors, the crimes were nonviolent, the punishments 
11 
 
imposed were lenient, and other jurisdictions also classified 
similar crimes as misdemeanors.  Id. at 351–53.  In Holloway, 
we also considered dangerousness of the offense when 
applying this approach to reject an as-applied challenge to 
another misdemeanor conviction—a DUI.  948 F.3d at 173–
77.6   
 
Contrary to what the dissent suggests, see Dissenting 
Op. 2, we have never held that felonies and state misdemeanors 
should be analyzed similarly or that the considerations we 
examined in Binderup and Holloway should be weighed 
equally.  Instead, we consistently viewed the legislature’s 
classification of the offense as a powerful consideration.  
Binderup, 836 F.3d at 352 (explaining the legislature’s label 
for an offense is a “powerful expression” of its view).  Our 
decision in Binderup was “limited to the cases before us, which 
involve[d] state-law misdemeanants . . . .  This is important 
because when a legislature chooses to call a crime a 
misdemeanor, we have an indication of non-seriousness that is 
lacking when it opts instead to use the felony label. We [were] 
not confronted with whether an as-applied Second Amendment 
challenge can succeed where the purportedly disqualifying 
offense is considered a felony . . . .”  Id. at 353 n.6.  And while 
the dissent is correct we left the issue of disarming felons open, 
see Dissenting Op. 5, we remarked that while a successful as-
 
6 A blink response may be that violence and dangerousness are 
the same.  Though there is overlap, they are not.  In Binderup, 
we described the consideration of “violence” as whether “the 
offense had the use or attempted use of force as an element.”  
836 F.3d at 352.  In Holloway, we clarified that certain offenses 
like DUIs are dangerous although the “use or threatened use of 
violence is not an element of [the crime].”  948 F.3d at 174.     
12 
 
applied challenge by a felon is possible, the challenger’s 
burden would be “extraordinarily high.” Id.  Thus the 
legislature’s decision to label an offense a felony is generally 
conclusive in our analysis of seriousness, and while we do not 
foreclose the possibility that a legislature could be overly 
punitive and classify as a felony an offense beyond the limits 
of the historical understanding, a “non-serious felony” would 
be rare.7   
 
Our differing treatment of felonies and misdemeanors 
remains true to Heller’s instruction that “longstanding 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons” were 
“presumptively lawful regulatory measures” constraining the 
scope of the right.  554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26; Barton, 633 
F.3d at 171 (“Heller's list of ‘presumptively lawful’ regulations 
is not dicta.”); see also Binderup, 836 F.3d at 359 n.3 
(Hardiman, J., concurring in part) (reading Heller’s discussion 
of lawful regulations as a limitation integral to its holding).8   
 
7 In Binderup, the dissent argued that all crimes subject to § 
922(g)(1) are disqualifying because their maximum possible 
punishment was conclusive proof of their seriousness.  That, 
we said, “puts the rabbit in the hat” because some 
misdemeanors “may be ‘so tame and technical as to be 
insufficient to justify the ban.’”  Binderup, 836 F.3d at 350 
(quoting Torres–Rosario, 658 F.3d at 113).  
 
8 While our dissenting colleague attempts to cast doubt on 
Heller’s general exclusion of felon disarmament laws from the 
scope of the right to arms, labeling it an “aside,” Dissenting 
Op. 5, that characterization falls far short of reality.  Recall that 




This approach further aligns with our earlier reasoning that 
“[m]isdemeanors are, and traditionally have been, considered 
less serious than felonies.”  Id. at 351 (quoting Baldwin v. New 
York, 399 U.S. 66, 70 (1970)).  The latter “were—and 
remain—the most serious category of crime [as] deemed by the 
legislature.”  Medina v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 152, 158 (D.C. Cir. 
2019) (Sentelle, J.).  
 
Our approach is also consistent with that of our sister 
circuits and state courts.  See id. at 155 (“[N]o circuit has held 
the law unconstitutional as applied to a convicted felon.”); see 
also id. at 154 (“[F]elons are not among the law-abiding, 
responsible citizens entitled to the protections of the Second 
Amendment.”); Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to 
Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical 
Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1443, 
1498 (2009) (collecting cases) (“Dozens of state court 
decisions likewise take the view that felons (even those 
convicted of nonviolent felonies) lack a constitutional right to 
keep and bear arms.”).   Thus, while those convicted of felonies 
may bring as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1), they are 
unlikely to succeed in all but the exceptional case.   
 
As we elaborate below, the precedents of the Supreme 
Court, our and other circuits, which hold that felonies are 
serious enough to ban firearm possession, find support in 
history and the general deference courts accord to a 
legislature’s policy determination of what is serious.   
 
 
it “did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures 
as ‘prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.’”  561 
U.S. at 786. 
14 
 
1. History confirms that felons committed serious 
crimes.  
 
A felony unquestionably encompasses a broader array 
of crimes today than it did in 1791.  Nonetheless, at the Second 
Amendment’s ratification felonies comprised “the most 
serious category of crime[s,]” just as they do now.  Medina, 
913 F.3d at 158 (citing Hamilton v. Pallozzi, 848 F.3d 614, 626 
(4th Cir. 2017)).  We inherited the term from England, where 
in its earliest form it referred to a “breach of the feudal 
obligations between lord and vassal,” the consequence of 
which was “forfeiture of goods and the escheat of the fief.”  
Will Tress, Unintended Collateral Consequences: Defining 
Felony in the Early American Republic, 57 Clev. St. L. Rev. 
461, 463 (2009).  As the term evolved to refer to a broader 
category of crimes, felons faced serious consequences: From 
at least twelfth-century on in England, felonies were 
punishable by death or the loss of goods and land.  Id. at 463–
64. 
 
Although the number of felonies at common law is 
limited,9 legislatures quickly began to expand the list.  Francis 
Bacon, writing in the seventeenth century, lists at least thirty-
four felonies punishable by death and forfeiture.  Many of these 
crimes are violent, such as burglary, rape, arson, and murder; 
but others are not, including unlawful hunting and repeated 
forgery.  See Francis Bacon, Preparation for the Union of Laws 
 
9 The nine traditional felonies at common law are murder, 
manslaughter, arson, burglary, robbery, rape, sodomy, 
mayhem, and larceny.  See Tress, supra, at 464 (citing Francis 
Wharton, Treatise on the Criminal Law of the United States 1 
(Philadelphia, James Kay, Jun. & Brother 1846)). 
15 
 
of England and Scotland, in 2 The Works of Francis Bacon 
163–64 (Basil Montagu ed., Cary & Hart 1844); see also 
Medina, 913 F.3d at 158 (citing 4 William Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England *95 (Harper ed. 1854)).  
Harsh punishment for felonies continued into the eighteenth 
century even as the number of crimes that qualified expanded.  
Blackstone writes that “no less than a hundred and sixty 
[offenses] have been declared by act of parliament [ ] to be 
felonies.”  4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *18.   
 
American colonists imported the English concept of 
felonies and their consequences into their legal systems.  The 
death penalty was ubiquitous in the Founding Era, see Baze v. 
Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 94 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing 
Stuart Banner, The Death Penalty: An American History 23 
(2002)), used even to punish non-violent felonies such as 
forgery and horse theft.  Medina, 913 F.3d at 158 (citing 
Banner, supra, at 18); see also John D. Bessler, Cruel & 
Unusual: The American Death Penalty and the Founders’ 
Eighth Amendment 56–57 (2012) (listing crimes the First 
Congress made “punishable by hanging, including treason, 
murder on federal land, forgery, [dealing in] forged securities, 
counterfeiting, and piracy on the high seas”); Kathryn Preyer, 
Penal Measures in the American Colonies: An Overview, 26 
Am. J. Legal Hist. 326, 330–32, 342, 344, 345–47 (1982) 
(discussing the use of capital punishment in eighteenth-century 
Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and New York).  The 
widespread, continued condemnation of felons, including 
those who committed non-violent offenses, to death 
demonstrates that in 1791 Americans understood felons, as a 




Given this, “it is difficult to conclude that the public, in 
1791, would have understood someone facing death and estate 
forfeiture to be within the scope of those entitled to possess 
arms.”  Medina, 913 F.3d at 158.  Americans in the Founding 
Era also believed “[i]t is because the people are civilized, that 
they are with safety armed.”  David B. Kopel, The Posse 
Comitatus and the Office of Sheriff: Armed Citizens 
Summoned to the Aid of Law Enforcement, 104 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 761, 794 (2014) (quoting the diplomat and 
Jeffersonian Republican Joel Barlow).  They saw the armed 
citizenry, in other words, as a bulwark of liberty, see Robert E. 
Shalhope, The Armed Citizen in the Early Republic, 49 Law & 
Contemp. Probs. 125, 131–32 (1986), in contrast to felons who 
could not be trusted, see Kopel, supra, at 789 n.154 (noting that 
under English law the sheriff could traditionally summon 
armed citizens to pursue fleeing felons, including thieves).  
Thus, the eighteenth-century American’s right to bear arms 
was intimately tied to long-standing practices that explicitly 
separated the class of armed law-abiding citizens from felons.  
“[N]o one . . . denies these historically grounded and sensible 
explanations behind the exceptions: Legislatures have 
authority . . . to impose lifetime gun-possession bans on felons 
as a safety measure and as a legitimate consequence of a felony 
conviction[.]”  Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 837 F.3d 
678, 708 (6th Cir. 2016) (Sutton, J., concurring).   
 
By the turn of the nineteenth century, Americans began 
to revise the penalties for felonies, reducing their severity and 
increasing the use of incarceration.  See Tress, supra, at 473.  
The First Congress outlawed forfeiture of estate as a 
punishment for felons under federal law.  Austin v. United 
States, 509 U.S. 602, 613 (1993).  States passed laws replacing 
capital punishment with incarceration, using the term “felony” 
17 
 
to denote crimes that required time in prison to “reform[] [ ] 
the convict’s character,” in contrast to less serious crimes “that 
only required a sharp reminder to obey the law.”  Tress, supra, 
at 468.  The punishment for felons extended to forfeiture of 
certain fundamental rights, including the right to vote.  See 
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 51 (1974) (noting that the 
act admitting Arkansas in 1868 provided it could 
disenfranchise those convicted of felonies at common law “as 
a punishment for such crimes.”).  Thus, even as the term 
evolved and expanded, felonies continued to reflect the 
category of serious crimes committed by those outside the 
virtuous citizenry. 
 
2. Our approach accords proper deference to the 
legislature’s determination.  
 
Our approach is not only consistent with history and 
tradition, but further safeguards the separation of powers by 
allowing democratically constituted legislatures, not unelected 
judges, to decide in most cases what types of conduct reflect so 
serious a breach of the social compact as to justify the loss of 
Second Amendment rights.  “When the legislature,” in this 
case Congress, “designates a crime as a felony, it signals to the 
world the highest degree of societal condemnation for the act,” 
Medina, 913 F.3d at 160.  In upholding Congress’s decision to 
disarm individuals who commit felonies, we respect the 
legislatures’ choices about which crimes count as serious and 
preserve the states’ traditional autonomy to “define crimes 
[and] punishments.”  Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 
280 (2008).  This ensures that disarmament decisions reflect 
the views and values of our communities, as well as the 
expertise and experience of legislatures “‘far better equipped 
than the judiciary’ to make sensitive public policy judgments.”  
18 
 
See Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 97 (2d Cir. 
2012) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 
665 (1994)); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (Easterbrook, J.) (observing that “the legislative role 
did not end in 1791” and that, in some cases, the Second 
Amendment “leav[es] to the people’s elected representatives 
the filling in of details”).    
 
Indeed, we defer to the legislature’s determination that 
individuals convicted of felonies may forfeit other fundamental 
rights, such as the right to vote and to sit on a jury, the former 
being the essence of our democracy.  See 28 U.S.C. § 
1865(b)(5); Richardson, 418 U.S. at 56; see also Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (“The right to vote  . . . is of 
the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that 
right strike at the heart of representative government.”).  As 
felons are rarely protected by the Second Amendment, 
Congress is also normally entitled to require disarmament as a 
result of a felony conviction without engaging in an evaluation 
of each felon’s rehabilitation and likelihood to engage in 
further criminal activity of any kind.  See Medina, 913 F.3d at 
160–61.  Accordingly, Congress has the flexibility to decide 
which crimes are captured by § 922.10  For instance, it 
 
10 Folajtar also cites 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), which allows those 
prohibited from possessing firearms under § 922(g)(1) to apply 
to the Attorney General for relief.  We explained in Binderup 
that this program is “a matter of legislative grace; the Second 
Amendment does not require that those who commit serious 
crimes be given an opportunity to regain their right to keep and 
bear arms in that fashion.”  836 F.3d at 350.  Further, 




determined that those convicted of antitrust felonies should not 
be covered by the statute because those crimes were only 
classified as felonies in a handful of states and were not 
felonies under federal law.  See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(A); S. 
Rep. No. 89-1866, at 77 (1966). 
 
Practical considerations confirm the wisdom of this 
approach.  Perhaps most important, our holding avoids the 
administrative difficulties that would result from applying a 
dangerousness standard to felonies.  Should the dissent’s 
proposal prevail, district courts would face the unenviable task 
of weighing the relative dangerousness of hundreds of offenses 
already deemed sufficiently serious to be classified as 
felonies.   Would the selling of mislabeled food or drugs, for 
example, count as a dangerous offense?  See 21 U.S.C. 
§ 331.  What about prescribing opioids without a legitimate 
medical purpose?  See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).  Or allowing toxic 
chemicals to leach into a public waterway?  See 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1319(c)(2)(B). 
 
This problem is not alleviated by describing the 
category as “crimes of violence” rather than “dangerous” 
offenses, as some have suggested.  See Dissenting Op. 
24; Binderup, 836 F.3d at 370 (Hardiman, J., 
concurring).  “[I]ndeterminacy about how to measure the risk 
posed by a crime [and] indeterminacy about how much risk it 
 
robust system of as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) is 
unworkable.  Id. at 403 (Fuentes, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“Congress effectively wr[o]te § 925(c) out 
of the statute books . . . [b]ecause it concluded that the task of 
granting individual applications for relief from § 922(g)(1) was 
too prone to error.” (emphasis omitted)).   
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takes for the crime to qualify as a violent felony . . . produce[ ] 
more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process 
Clause tolerates.”  Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 598 
(2015); accord United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. ––––, 139 S. 
Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019); Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. –––– , 
138 S. Ct. 1204, 1223 (2018).  Under our approach, those who 
commit felonies are on notice that they are committing a 
serious offense, and, with rare exceptions, that they thereby 
forfeit their rights under the Second Amendment.  By giving 
primary weight to the legislature’s determination, our approach 
is no doubt more administrable.   
 
C. The dissent’s focus on dangerousness alone is too 
narrow. 
 
Even if we put aside administrative concerns, the 
dissent’s position that only dangerousness should be 
considered in our analysis would raise serious institutional 
concerns given the clearly established precedents in our Circuit 
and elsewhere.  And in any event the dissent adopts an overly 
narrow view of danger that is inconsistent with historical 
readings.   
 
In addition to parting with the overwhelming consensus 
among our sister circuits, see supra 13, the dissent’s standard 
would require us to ignore the Supreme Court’s general 
exclusion of all felons from the scope of the Second 
Amendment right, see Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27; McDonald, 
561 U.S. at 786; contradict our own precedents making clear 
that seriousness of the offense defines the historical class for 
criminal offenses, see Binderup, 836 F.3d at 350 (Ambro, J.); 
id. at 387 (Fuentes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
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part); Holloway, 948 F.3d at 171; and stray too far into the 
province of the legislative branch.  This we should not do.  
 
The dissent is largely rehashing the same sources and 
arguments as Judge Hardiman’s Binderup concurrence.  See 
Dissenting Op. 6–9.  But our Court has repudiated three times 
in just the past four years that concurrence’s narrow focus on 
dangerousness.  Ten of the fifteen judges to participate in 
Binderup rejected it, making explicit their conclusion was part 
of Binderup’s holding and not a dictum.  See 836 F.3d at 356 
(“[T]he following is the law of our Circuit . . . . [A] challenger 
must prove that he was not previously convicted of 
a serious crime[.]” (emphasis added)).  A subsequent panel of 
our Court similarly recognized that “the historical justification 
for disarming felons was because they had committed serious 
crimes, [and the] risk of violent recidivism was 
irrelevant.”  Beers v. Att’y Gen., 927 F.3d 150, 156 (3d Cir. 
2019), judgment vacated on other grounds, Beers v. Barr, 140 
S. Ct. 2758 (Mem.) (May 18, 2020).   
 
And again, earlier this year, we reiterated that 
in Binderup “ten judges agreed that the correct test . . . is 
whether the offense is ‘serious,’ not whether the offense is 
violent.”  Holloway, 948 F.3d 171 n.7.  If stare decisis means 
anything, it means that we cannot, without gravely impugning 
the stability and legitimacy of the judiciary, revisit the position 
so recently espoused by a majority of our en banc court and by 
two panels since.  As the Chief Justice recently 
explained, stare decisis “must give way only to a rationale that 
goes beyond whether the case was decided correctly.”  June 
Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2134 (2020) 
(Roberts, C.J., concurring).  We see no such ground for 
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revisiting Binderup, Beers, or Holloway today, and the dissent 
highlights none.  
 
We need not fully repeat the historical analysis in our 
precedents but note for completeness that the dissent’s 
dangerousness standard is also inconsistent with history.  
While colonial Virginia permitted the constable to “take away 
Arms from such who ride, or go, offensively armed, in Terror 
of the People,” and bring the person and their arms before a 
Justice of the Peace, see George Webb, The Office of Authority 
of a Justice of Peace 92–93 (1736), other colonies did not 
require violence or dangerousness for disarmament.  For 
example, Connecticut prohibited those who defamed or libeled 
acts of Congress from keeping arms.  See G.A. Gilbert, The 
Connecticut Loyalists, 4 Am. Hist. Rev. 273, 282 (1899).  
Similarly, Pennsylvania law required any “person [who] 
‘refuse[d] or neglect[ed] to take the oath or affirmation’ of 
allegiance to the state . . . to deliver up his arms to agents of 
the state, and he was not permitted to carry any arms about his 
person or keep any arms or ammunition in his ‘house or 
elsewhere.’” Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well 
Regulated Right: The Early American Origins of Gun Control, 
73 Fordham L. Rev. 487, 506 (2004) (quoting Act of Apr. 1, 
1778, ch. LXI, § 5, 1777-1778 Pa. Laws 123, 126).  
Massachusetts also disarmed “such Persons as are notoriously 
disaffected to the Cause of America, or who refuse to associate 
to defend by Arms the United American Colonies.” Id. at 507 
(quoting Act of Mar. 14, 1776, ch. VII, 1775-1776 Mass. Acts 
31, 31).11  
 
11 The dissent contends that these latter three laws were about 




Later, at their ratification conventions, several states 
proposed amendments limiting the right to bear arms to both 
law-abiding and “peaceable” citizens.  The Anti-Federalists in 
Pennsylvania issued the Address and Reasons of Dissent of the 
Minority of the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to 
Their Constituents, which proposed that “the people have a 
right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and their own 
State or the United States, or for the purpose of killing game; 
and no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any of 
them unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public 
injury from individuals . . . .”  2 Bernard Schwartz, The Bill of 
Rights: A Documentary History 662, 665 (1971) (emphasis 
added).  “Heller identified . . . [this report] as a ‘highly 
influential’ ‘precursor’ to the Second Amendment.”  Binderup, 
836 F.3d at 349 (citation omitted).  Other states proposed 
similar amendments.  New Hampshire proposed that 
“Congress shall never disarm any citizen, unless such as are or 
have been in actual rebellion,” see 1 Debates in the Several 
State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 
326 (Jonathan Elliott ed., 2d ed. J.B. Lippincott 1891), and 
Massachusetts submitted that “the said Constitution be never 
construed . . . to prevent the people of the United States[] who 
are peaceable citizens . . . from keeping their own arms . . . .”  
See Schwartz, supra, at 681.  While the dissent attempts to 
shoehorn all of these proposals and laws into the silo of 
dangerousness, a more accurate reading recognizes that while 
some ratification and legislative bodies at the Founding 
focused on the dangers that certain people posed, others 
 
swear an oath, defaming acts of Congress, or failing to defend 
the colonies do not of themselves qualify as dangerous.  The 
same is true of the examples cited by the dissent of refusing to 
swear allegiance or loyalty to the sovereign.   
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disarmed a broader portion of the populace based on 
“virtuousness” and the seriousness of the crime, just as we 
explained in Binderup.  Neither we nor the dissent has 
unearthed any evidence that the laws or proposed amendments 
were then thought to be unconstitutional. 
 
No doubt some of the laws at the Founding were 
concerned about dangerousness.  The dissent’s cherry-picked 
history only shows that dangerousness was one reason to 
restrict firearm possession, but it hardly was the only one.  It is 
hence insufficient to highlight those laws disarming the 
dangerous when the constitutional coverage is broader.   
 
The dissent claims that the felon-in-possession 
provision is wildly overinclusive. See Dissenting Op. 25.  To 
the contrary, it is the dissent’s dangerousness-focused 
approach that is wildly underinclusive in failing to explain 
many Founding Era firearms regulations.  What concerned the 
Framers was that “virtuous citizens” retain the right to bear 
arms, Binderup, 836 F.3d at 348; they had no interest in 
extending the same guarantee to those who act counter to 
society’s welfare, whether by violent or non-violent acts.   That 
is why Connecticut disarmed libelers, see Gilbert, supra at 282, 
and why Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists proposed stripping all 
criminals of the right to bear arms, see Schwartz, supra at 665.  
None of these restrictions narrowly target citizens who 
committed inherently violent or dangerous crimes.   
 
And there is good reason not to trust felons, even non-
violent ones, with firearms.  As one of our sister circuits 
observed, nonviolent offenders are at higher propensity for 
committing violent crimes.  See Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 
449 (7th Cir. 2019) (noting several studies establishing a 
25 
 
connection between non-violent offenses and a risk of future 
violent crime).  The dissent claims that these studies “lump tax 
fraudsters together with burglars and drug dealers[,]” 
Dissenting Op. 25, but supplemental tables to the U.S. 
Department of Justice report cited in Kanter clarified the data 
by explicitly separating fraud offenders from both burglars and 
drug offenders, as well as those who committed robbery or 
larceny.  See Matthew R. Durose, et al., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Supplemental Tables: Most 
Serious Commitment Offense and Types of Post-Release 
Arrest Charges of Prisoners Released in 30 States in 2005, at 
t.2 (2016).  About thirty percent of burglars and twenty-five 
percent of drug offenders who were sentenced to at least a year 
of imprisonment were subsequently arrested for a violent crime 
within five years of their release from state prison, compared 
with about twenty percent of fraud or forgery offenders.  Id. 
The dissent admits that “disarming burglars and drug dealers 
makes sense,” Dissenting Op. 25, but the small difference in 
the risk of future violent crime between those crimes and fraud 
cannot support the dissent’s position that the legislature can use 
these “rules of thumb” to disarm burglars and drug dealers, but 
not felons for fraud crimes.    
 
As the dissent would have it, the Second Amendment 
mandates that those who have flouted the laws of the land and 
shown utter disregard for the welfare of their fellow citizens—
felons like Bernard Madoff (convicted of various counts of 
fraud, perjury and money laundering in connection with the 
largest Ponzi scheme in history), Jeffrey Skilling (the CEO of 
Enron convicted of fraud and insider trading), and Jordan 
Belfort (author of The Wolf of Wall Street convicted of fraud 
and stock market manipulation)— must be trusted with a 
firearm if their felonies were “merely” white-collar (read non-
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dangerous) crimes.  The above-referenced laws reflect 
otherwise, and we decline to hold that legislatures may regulate 
only the firearm possession of dangerous felons when the 
constitutional coverage extends to all those who cannot be 
trusted to carry firearms responsibly because they committed 
serious crimes. 
 
D. Folajtar does not overcome the general rule that her 
felony is a serious crime. 
 
 As felony status is generally conclusive evidence that 
the offense is serious, we ask whether Folajtar’s offense is so 
exceptional for it to fall outside the historical bar.  She asserts 
that her felony conviction is distinguishable from the 
“longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons” in Heller, 554 U.S. at 626, because it is not among the 
nine English common law felonies or the felony convictions 
requiring disarmament in the 1938 Federal Firearms Act.  We 
are unpersuaded.12  As we explained in Binderup, “the 
category of serious crimes changes over time as legislative 
 
12 Folajtar also urges us to reconsider our holding that the 
passage of time cannot restore a convicted felon’s Second 
Amendment rights.  As we are bound by Binderup, 836 F.3d at 
349–350, we decline to consider this request as well.  See also 
Medina, 913 F.3d at 160 (“Nor can [an individual’s] present 
contributions to his community, the passage of time, or 
evidence of his rehabilitation un-ring the bell of his 
conviction.”); Hamilton, 848 F.3d at 626 (“[E]vidence of 
rehabilitation, likelihood of recidivism, and passage of time are 
not bases for which a challenger might remain in the protected 
class of law-abiding, responsible citizen[s].” (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
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judgments regarding virtue evolve.”  836 F.3d at 351.  Hence 
“exclusions need not mirror limits that were on the books in 
1791.”  Id. (quoting Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641).  
  
In any case, Folajtar’s felony is not obviously less 
serious than the historical felonies as she would suggest.  To 
violate 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1), a defendant must, while “under 
the penalties of perjury,” submit a tax return that “[s]he does 
not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter.”  
By making a tax return that she knew to be false, Folajtar 
willfully deprived the Government of its property.  This act is 
no less serious than larceny, one of the nine common law 
felonies, or forgery, one of the first felonies in the United 
States.  See supra 14–15; see also Hamilton, 848 F.3d at 627 
(“Theft, fraud, and forgery are not merely errors in filling out 
a form or some regulatory misdemeanor offense; these are 
significant offenses reflecting disrespect for the law.”); 
Abdelqadar v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(Easterbrook, J.) (“Crimes entailing deceit or false statement 
are within the core of the common-law understanding of ‘moral 
turpitude.’”).  Indeed, a conviction for violating § 7206(1) 
“necessarily entail[s] deceit.” Kawashima, 565 U.S. at 485 
(holding that a violation of § 7206(1) can be serious enough to 
be an aggravated felony and deportable offense under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act); see also Jordan v. De 
George, 341 U.S. 223, 229 (1951) (holding that defrauding the 
United States of tax on distilled spirits is a serious crime 
involving moral turpitude).  Thus, we can be confident that 
Folajtar’s offense falls outside “the scope of the Second 
Amendment’s guarantee” to possess firearms, Marzzarella, 
614 F.3d at 89, and we need not proceed to Step Two of the 




Our decision, like those of some of our sister circuits, 
does not adopt a blanket rule categorically foreclosing an as-
applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) for a felony conviction, and 
we do not rule out the possibility of an exceptional federal or 
state felony unmoored from the bar’s historical underpinnings.  
See, e.g., Hamilton, 848 F.3d 614; Kanter, 919 F.3d 437; 
Medina, 913 F.3d 152.  But that is not the case before us today.   
Unlike the dissent’s examples of felonies, see Dissenting Op. 
21–22 (noting that opening a bottle of ketchup is a felony in 
New Jersey, reading another person’s email without 
permission is a felony in Pennsylvania, and uttering obscene 
language on radio communications is a federal felony), tax 
fraud, akin to falsifying information on a bank loan application 
in Medina, is a felony that “reflect[s] grave misjudgment.”  
Medina, 913 F.3d at 158 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).   
 
* * * * * 
Legislatures have always regulated the right to bear 
arms.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 626; 1 William Blackstone, 
Commentaries *139 (describing the English right to bear arms, 
which protected the right “of having arms for their defence, 
suitable to their condition and degree, and such as are allowed 
by law”); Lawrence Rosenthal, The Limits of the Second 
Amendment Originalism and the Constitutional Case for Gun 
Control, 92 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1187, 1210 (2015) (noting that 
at the Founding laws disarmed certain groups, such as those 
unwilling to swear allegiance to the Revolution).  Heller 
recognizes that the Second Amendment permits a broad bar for 
felons, and our historical analysis confirms that generally 
conclusive ban.  When Folajtar committed a federal felony of 
materially misstating her tax liability, a serious crime, she 
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removed herself from the constitutionally protected class of 
“law-abiding citizens.” Thus her claim fails at Marzzarella 
Step One.   
 
The dissent’s concern for the rehabilitation of convicted 
criminals is commendable, and we agree with our dissenting 
colleague that, as illustrated by nineteenth-century state and 
federal legislatures’ decisions to reduce the use of capital 
punishment and focus on the rehabilitation of convicted 
criminals, society need not implement the law according to the 
outer boundaries of what is constitutional.  But the choice 
society has made in this case, by way of Congress’s enactment 
of the felon-in-possession statute and the tax felony statute 
under which Folajtar was convicted, lies within those 
boundaries.  Thus, if Folajtar and others in her position wish to 
seek recourse, it is to the legislature, and not to the judiciary, 
that their efforts should be directed.  We thus affirm.   
BIBAS, Circuit Judge, dissenting.  
Today, the majority holds that the Government may disarm 
all felons except when it may not. My colleagues endorse a 
near-categorical rule with a hint of an escape hatch and clothe 
everything with the authority of Heller and Binderup. Maj. Op. 
6, 10–14. But the clothes do not fit. Neither case decided 
whether nondangerous felons should lose their Second Amend-
ment rights. And a closer look at the majority opinion shows 
that it strays from Binderup’s method of analyzing as-applied 
challenges. 
To see the majority’s missteps, we must be clear about what 
it holds: It is essentially a blanket ban. When a legislature la-
bels a crime a felony, that label is “generally conclusive,” and 
the Government may disarm felons. Maj. Op. 6. Though in  
theory a few felonies might be too minor to count, the majority 
never defines this caveat. All it says is that such felonies are 
“rare exceptions.” Maj. Op. 20. 
Yet abdicating to labels is unfaithful to our precedent. The 
three-judge opinion in Binderup scrutinized limits on Second 
Amendment rights by looking at four factors: whether the 
crime is violent, whether it is a felony, whether other jurisdic-
tions agree that it is serious, and whether the sentence imposed 
is severe. 836 F.3d at 351–53. Holloway added a fifth factor 
related to violence: dangerousness. 948 F.3d at 172–77; Maj. 
Op. 11. And under the five-judge Binderup concurrence, we 
would focus “on the legitimate (i.e., traditional) concern that 
justifies the dispossession of certain offenders: we cannot trust 
them not to commit violent crimes with firearms.” 836 F.3d at 
374. Both tests weigh danger, either directly or through the lens 
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of violence. Yet today, the majority sets aside dangerousness, 
violence, the sentence imposed, and cross-jurisdictional con-
sensus. 
Instead, the majority shears the multi-factor test in 
Binderup and Holloway down to a single factor: whether the 
legislature labeled the crime a felony. It emphasizes that its rule 
defers to the legislature and is administratively convenient. 
These were the same arguments made by the Binderup dissent. 
836 F.3d at 400–03 (Fuentes, J., dissenting). There, the dissent 
pushed for a categorical rule like the one the majority adopts 
today. Id. at 388. It rejected the possibility of as-applied chal-
lenges. A majority of our Court, however, let as-applied chal-
lenges proceed and succeed. 
As an original matter, the majority’s rule also conflicts with 
the historical limits on the Second Amendment. Those limits 
protect us from felons, but only if they are dangerous. Yet the 
majority endorses a near-blanket ban. It allows disarming vir-
tually all felons, even nondangerous ones, based on two related 
historical claims: First, it argues that the right to bear arms was 
limited to the virtuous. Second, it asserts that at the Founding, 
felons were unvirtuous because they had committed serious, 
indeed capital, crimes.  
Both claims overread the history. The historical touchstone 
is danger, not virtue. Though the majority relies largely on 
scholars and other circuits for its theory, its layers and layers 
of citations are mainly inapt. Most of the historical sources in-
volved people who were dangerous. And most of the articles 
and cases rely on one another, adopt historical readings re-
jected by Heller, or even repudiate the majority’s rule. When 
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one sees through the layers, the emperor is not quite naked, but 
at most he is wearing a loincloth. 
The majority makes no more headway by arguing that fel-
onies are serious. Today, because the felony label is arbitrary 
and manipulable, many felonies are far less serious than those 
at common law. Even historically, there is no evidence that all 
felons were disarmed as part of their punishment. Gun re-
strictions on those jailed and awaiting execution tell us nothing 
about criminals who had paid their debts to society and been 
freed. Most punishments were temporary. We punished the 
crime, not the criminal. The colonists did not treat ex-cons as 
a permanently exiled underclass, forever branded “unvirtu-
ous.” 
The majority’s extreme deference gives legislatures unre-
viewable power to manipulate the Second Amendment by 
choosing a label. “Unvirtuousness” based on the felony label 
is a mushy standard that sets no limit. We must not reflexively 
defer to that label when a fundamental right is at stake, but  
rather require narrow tailoring to public safety. 
Felons are more than the wrongs they have done. They are 
people and citizens who are part of “We the People of the 
United States.” U.S. Const. pmbl. So they too share in the Sec-
ond Amendment “right of the people to keep and bear Arms,” 
subject only to the historical limits on that right. Although Lisa 
Folajtar was convicted of tax fraud nine years ago, she is not 
dangerous. Neither the majority nor the Government suggests 




I. THE HISTORY OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT ALLOWS 
DISARMING ONLY DANGEROUS FELONS 
As my colleagues agree, the Second Amendment’s scope 
depends on its history. Historically, limitations on the right 
were tied to dangerousness. In England and colonial America, 
the Government disarmed people who posed a danger to  
others. Violence was one ground for fearing danger, as were 
disloyalty and rebellion. Though the Binderup plurality es-
poused the virtue theory, the articles and cases that it cited 
mostly fit the dangerousness test. In any event, those sources 
rest on one another, promote a reading of the history rejected 
by Heller, or even repudiate the rule the majority adopts today. 
The right historical test is not virtue, but dangerousness. 
A. Precedent does not settle the historical test for  
disarming felons 
The majority begins with a mistaken premise. The Supreme 
Court has not addressed the historical pedigree of laws disarm-
ing felons. Yet the majority reads Heller as upholding the 
“longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons.” Maj. Op. 6 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626). But  
Heller limited its remark to “longstanding” bans. Longstanding 
bans are centuries old, not within living memory. See Heller, 
554 U.S. at 626 (citing Blackstone and 19th-century cases). 
The federal felon-in-possession ban, however, did not begin to 
reach beyond violent crimes until 1961. An Act to Strengthen 




Heller’s aside also described the bans “as only ‘presump-
tively lawful.’ ” Binderup, 836 F.3d at 350 (opinion of Ambro, 
J.) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26). “Unless 
flagged as irrebuttable, presumptions are rebuttable.” Id. And 
its remark was dictum. Heller did not and had no occasion to 
resolve when governments may disarm felons. So like the  
Seventh Circuit, we should “refuse[ ]  to read too much into the 
[Heller] Court’s ‘precautionary language.’ ” Kanter v. Barr, 
919 F.3d at 445 (quoting Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640).  
Our own cases likewise do not resolve the historical ques-
tion for felons. The three-judge opinion in Binderup expressly 
left open the issue of disarming felons. 836 F.3d at 353 n.6. 
Later, a panel in Beers read Binderup to say that “the historical 
justification for disarming felons was that they were ‘unvirtu-
ous.’ ” 927 F.3d at 156 (quoting Binderup, 836 F.3d at 348), 
vacated, 140 S. Ct. 2758 (2020) (mem.). But Beers was va-
cated, so it is not precedent. And Holloway dropped a footnote, 
relying on the now-vacated decision in Beers to “set forth the 
Binderup majority holdings.” 948 F.3d at 170–71 & n.5. So 
that footnote was built on sand that has since washed away. 
Plus, neither panel decision did a Marks analysis of the frac-
tured opinions in Binderup. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 
188, 193 (1977). And none of our cases involved felons. See 
Beers, 927 F.3d at 152 (mentally ill persons); Doe, 977 F.3d at 
274 (same); Holloway, 948 F.3d at 168 (first-degree misde-
meanant); see also id. at 174–75 (stressing that the felony/mis-
demeanor label is hardly dispositive). 
6 
 
Thus, the issue of disarming felons is open. Precedent does 
not settle its historical limits. Rather, we must analyze the his-
tory ourselves and ask: Were all felons, dangerous and non-
dangerous alike, equally excluded from the Second Amend-
ment? No, they were not. 
B. Historically, Second Amendment rights were limited for 
dangerous—but not nondangerous—felons 
The history of felon disarmament is well canvassed by 
Judge Hardiman’s concurrence in Binderup, 836 F.3d at 367–
74, as well as then-Judge Barrett’s dissent in Kanter, 919 F.3d 
at 453–64. Their analyses show that the limit on the Second 
Amendment right was pegged to dangerousness, not some 
vague notion of “virtue.” I draw heavily on then-Judge  
Barrett’s research below, which goes well beyond the sources 
in Binderup. Both English and early American law, through the 
Founding, reflected the dangerousness test. 
1. English and early American laws disarmed the danger-
ous. Stripping the right to bear arms does have ancient origins. 
In England, royal officers could seize arms from those who 
were “dangerous to the Peace of the Kingdom.” Militia Act of 
1662, 13 & 14 Car. 2, c.3, § 13. And they could seize arms from 
and imprison “people who [went] armed to terrify the King’s 
subjects.” Sir John Knight’s Case, 87 Eng. Rep. 75, 76 (K.B. 
1686), both quoted in Kanter, 919 F.3d at 456–57 (Barrett, J., 
dissenting). Both sources authorized disarming the dangerous. 
The American colonies had similar laws. They were partic-
ularly fearful of the disloyal, who were potentially violent and 
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thus dangerous. Some colonies, like Virginia and Massachu-
setts, disarmed Catholics “on the basis of allegiance, not on the 
basis of faith,” “with the intent of preventing social upheavals” 
and “rebellion.” Robert H. Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Po-
lice Power, and the Right to Keep Arms in Early America: The 
Legal Context of the Second Amendment, 25 Law & Hist. Rev. 
139, 157 (2007); Alexander DeConde, Gun Violence in Amer-
ica 22–23 (2001), both quoted in Kanter, 919 F.3d at 457  
(Barrett, J., dissenting).  
During the American Revolution, Massachusetts and Penn-
sylvania disarmed loyalists to the Crown who refused to swear 
allegiance to the state or the United States to “eliminate[ ]  the 
opportunity for [them] to violently protest the actions of the 
[state] government.” Cornell & DeDino at 506–07. Connecti-
cut likewise disarmed seditious loyalists because “the welfare 
of the people was jeopard[iz]ed through the hostile influence 
of Tories.” Gilbert at 281–82. It did so on the advice of the 
Continental Congress to “secure every person, who, going at 
large, might in their opinion endanger the safety of the colony 
or liberties of America.” Id. at 281. And after Shays’s Rebel-
lion, the Massachusetts legislature made rebels “who had taken 
up arms against the state” swear allegiance and give up their 
arms for three years before they could be pardoned. Cornell & 
DeDino at 507–08. 
The majority misreads the disarming of loyalists as about 
virtue, because refusing to swear loyalty was not a dangerous 
action. Maj. Op. 22–23 & n.11. That misses the point. Loyalists 
were potential rebels who were dangerous before they erupted 
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into violence. The colonists understandably feared that loyal-
ists endangered both them and the nascent Republic as the loy-
alists struggled to keep America in the British fold. To ensure 
peace and safety, the colonies had to disarm them. The touch-
stone was not virtue, but danger. 
2. The proposals from the state ratifying conventions do 
not support a broader rule. Little evidence from the Founding 
supports a near-blanket ban for all felons. I cannot find, and the 
majority does not cite, any case or statute from that era that 
imposed or authorized such bans. See Kanter, 919 F.3d at 454 
(Barrett, J., dissenting). Instead, the majority cites proposals 
made during the constitutional ratifying conventions of three 
colonies. Maj. Op. 23–24. Yet this evidence is thin and mostly 
consistent with focusing on dangerousness. 
New Hampshire limited its proposal to danger. Its conven-
tion proposed: “Congress shall never disarm any citizen, unless 
such as are or have been in actual rebellion.” 1 Elliott at 326 
(emphasis added). Rebels posed a risk of insurrection and so 
were dangerous. 
Massachusetts’s convention likewise was concerned about 
danger. Its proposal, never adopted, would have guaranteed the 
right to keep arms to “peaceable citizens.” 2 Schwartz at 675, 
681. “Peaceable” meant “[f]ree from war; free from tumult”; 
“[q]uiet; undisturbed”; “[n]ot violent; not bloody”; “[n]ot quar-
relsome; not turbulent.” 1 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the 
English Language (5th ed. 1773), quoted in Kanter, 919 F.3d 
at 455 (Barrett, J., dissenting). Breach of the peace was a “vio-
lation of the public peace, as by a riot, affray, or any tumult 
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which is contrary to law, and destructive to the public tranquil-
ity.” Breach, Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the 
English Language (1828), quoted in Kanter, 919 F.3d at 455 
(Barrett, J., dissenting). So Massachusetts’s proposal would 
have disarmed those who caused physical disruptions and 
threatened public safety. It did not refer to “virtue.” 
The strongest support for a near-blanket exclusion comes 
from the proposal of the Pennsylvania minority. It would have 
guaranteed the right of arms “unless for crimes committed, or 
real danger of public injury from individuals.” 2 Schwartz at 
665. But that is only one piece of evidence. Read broadly, it 
would nullify our holding in Binderup, which recognized the 
Second Amendment rights of minor misdemeanants. In any 
event, the proposal does not clarify the meaning of the Second 
Amendment: it was suggested by a minority of the Pennsylva-
nia ratifying convention that failed to persuade its own state, 
let alone others. A single failed proposal is too dim a candle to 
illumine the Second Amendment’s scope. 
C. The virtue theory is not supported by history 
The majority disregards the traditional dangerousness lim-
itation. Instead, it reads the history as limiting the right to keep 
and bear arms to those who are virtuous. See Maj. Op. 9–10, 
24. My colleagues are in good company; many other circuits 
have adopted that theory too. Even so, it is unfounded. 
The majority draws its virtue theory from the Binderup plu-
rality, which claimed: “[M]ost scholars of the Second Amend-
ment agree that the right to bear arms was tied to the concept 
of a virtuous citizenry and that, accordingly, the government 
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could disarm ‘unvirtuous citizens.’ ” 836 F.3d at 348 (alteration 
in original) (quoting United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 
684–85 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)). To support that claim, 
the Binderup plurality cited eight academic articles and deci-
sions of six other circuits. 836 F.3d at 348–49. Though the list 
looks long and impressive, that impression is misleading. On 
close inspection, each layer lacks historical support or even un-
dermines the majority’s near-categorical rule. 
1. The academic sources have no solid historical founda-
tion for the virtue theory. Start with the academic sources. 
They are like the layers of a matryoshka doll, each nested layer 
successively larger with little at the core. Once we take them 
apart, none proves that felons’ lack of virtue excludes them 
from the Second Amendment. 
To begin, three of the articles collapse into one. The first 
cites no primary historical sources other than the state ratifying 
conventions discussed above, and the other two cite that article 
without adding anything: 
• First is Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the 
Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 Mich. 
L. Rev. 204 (1983) (Kates, Handgun Prohibition). 
Kates writes that “[f]elons simply did not fall within the 
benefits of the common law right to possess arms” be-
cause they faced forfeiture of all goods and usually the 
death penalty. Id. at 266. He also states that the Found-
ers did not “consider[ ] felons within the common law 
right to arms or intend[ ] to confer any such right upon 
them.” Id. As support, he cites only the Massachusetts, 
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New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania ratifying conven-
tions. Id. at 266 n.267. As discussed, Massachusetts and 
New Hampshire’s conventions did not propose to dis-
arm all felons; Pennsylvania’s minority proposal failed 
to persuade its own convention. Thus, the article does 
not support its key assertion. And as I discuss below, the 
status of felons awaiting execution tells us nothing 
about convicts who have completed their sentences. 
• Second is another Don B. Kates, Jr., article: The Second 
Amendment: A Dialogue, 49 Law & Contemp. Probs. 
143 (Winter 1986) (Kates, Dialogue). Kates writes this 
time that “the right to arms does not preclude laws dis-
arming the unvirtuous citizens (i.e., criminals).” Id. at 
146. His only source for this claim? His own previous 
article. Id. at 146 n.19 (citing Kates, Handgun Prohibi-
tion, at 266). The point remains unsupported. 
• Third is Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the 
Second Amendment, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 461 (1995). 
Reynolds quotes Kates’s Dialogue to show that felons 
had no right to bear arms. Id. at 480 (quoting Kates, Di-
alogue, at 146). He does not discuss any historical 
sources himself. So the point is still unsupported. 
Another three of the articles do not even discuss felons or 
crimes. These articles also rest on the collective-rights theory 
that Heller rejected:  
• Start with David Yassky, The Second Amendment: 
Structure, History, and Constitutional Change, 99 
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Mich. L. Rev. 588 (2000). Yassky asserts that “[t]he av-
erage citizen whom the Founders wished to see armed 
was a man of republican virtue.” Id. at 626. He bases 
that assertion on his understanding that the Second 
Amendment is not an individual right, but one tied to an 
organized militia. Id. at 627. Heller, of course, later re-
jected Yassky’s reading of the history. 554 U.S. at 582, 
592–602. And Yassky does not discuss felons or crimes.  
• Next is Saul Cornell, “Don’t Know Much About His-
tory”: The Current Crisis in Second Amendment Schol-
arship, 29 N. Ky. L. Rev. 657 (2002) (Cornell, Current 
Crisis). Cornell argues that the Founders understood the 
right to bear arms “as a civic right.” Id. at 679. Like 
Yassky, he reads it as limited to “militia service,” not as 
an individual right. Id. The right, he says, “was not 
something that all persons could claim, but was limited 
to those members of the polity who were deemed capa-
ble of exercising it in a virtuous manner.” Id. Thus, as 
with Yassky, Cornell’s collective-rights reading con-
flicts with Heller. Plus, his evidence does not support 
the conclusion he reaches. He cites Pennsylvania’s Test 
Acts of 1777, which required citizens to take loyalty 
oaths. See id. at 680 (citing Saul Cornell, Commonplace 
or Anachronism, 16 Const. Comment. 221, 229 (1999)). 
Those who refused were disarmed as “persons disaf-
fected to the liberty and independence of this state.” 
Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism, at 228. That 
fits the general Founding-era fear that rebels were dan-
gerous. So his evidence does not show that virtue, rather 
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than danger, was the touchstone. He also does not dis-
cuss felons or crimes. 
• Last is Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regu-
lated Right: The Early American Origins of Gun Con-
trol, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 487 (2004). Cornell and 
DeDino write that “the Second Amendment was 
strongly connected to the republican ideologies of the 
Founding Era, particularly the notion of civic virtue.” 
Id. at 492. They read the right as a collective one tied to 
the militia, not about individual self-defense. Id. at 496–
98. As with the previous two articles, their reading of 
the right as collective (not individual) conflicts with 
Heller. And they do not discuss crimes or disarming  
felons. Nor do they delve into primary sources to show 
that the colonists excluded nondangerous felons from 
that right as unvirtuous citizens. Instead, they recognize 
that the Founders were “deeply immersed in” the Eng-
lish common-law tradition. Id. at 492. As discussed, 
English law disarmed the dangerous, not the unvirtuous. 
Finally, two of the articles undermine the virtue theory and 
the majority’s broad ban. Indeed, the first one says that today’s 
result is “next to absurd”:  
• Consider Don B. Kates & Clayton E. Cramer, Second 
Amendment Limitations & Criminological Considera-
tions, 60 Hastings L.J. 1339 (2009). Kates and Cramer, 
citing many of the sources above, state that “the right to 
arms was inextricably and multifariously linked to that 
of civic virtu (i.e., the virtuous citizenry).” Id. at 1359 
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(citing Cornell & DeDino at 492; Kates, Handgun Pro-
hibition at 231–33; and Robert E. Shalhope, The Armed 
Citizen in the Early Republic, 49 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 125, 128 (1986), which does not mention felons 
or crime). They rely on the Massachusetts ratifying con-
vention as proof that the Founders “would have deemed 
persons convicted of any of the common law felonies” 
to be unvirtuous. Id. at 1360 (emphasis added). But then 
they say that it would be “next to absurd to suggest” that 
gun rights should be stripped because of minor felony 
convictions, like “income tax evasion.” Id. at 1363. 
Kates and Cramer’s article thus contradicts the major-
ity’s rule today. 
• The same is true of C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t  
Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. 
Pol’y 695 (2009). It is unclear why the Binderup plural-
ity cited this article; it does not even mention virtue. 
Marshall undermines the virtue theory and the major-
ity’s near-blanket ban. He argues that the law stripped 
the right only from those who posed a “genuine present 
danger to others.” Id. at 728. Canvassing primary 
sources, he maintains that the English right to arms and 
the common law at the time of the Founding did not  
categorically disarm felons for life. See id. at 697, 714–
28. True, some felons could be disarmed—but only “to 
some extent, for some time.” Id. at 728.  
In short, half the articles rest on one another. Not one cites 
primary sources (apart from the ratifying conventions) that 
support disarming nondangerous felons; the one that delves 
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into primary sources on that point (Marshall) is to the contrary. 
Three are not about felons at all. Three rest on collective-rights 
readings rejected by Heller. And two oppose the majority’s 
near-blanket rule. Far from supporting the majority, the schol-
arship in Binderup—the majority’s key authority (Maj. Op. 
9)—undercuts it. 
2. Other circuits’ opinions offer no better grounding for 
the virtue theory. The other circuits’ opinions relied on by the 
Binderup plurality, and thus the majority, also do not soundly 
support excluding nondangerous felons based on their lack of 
virtue. Most rest on the sources discussed earlier or on nothing 
at all. And though many speak of virtue, they are mostly con-
cerned with dangerousness. 
To begin, three opinions did not even endorse the virtue 
theory: 
• In its pre-Heller case, the Fifth Circuit never mentioned 
virtue or cited sources discussing it. It upheld a ban on 
gun possession because, “[i]rrespective of whether his 
offense was violent in nature, a felon has shown mani-
fest disregard for the rights of others.” United States v. 
Everist, 368 F.3d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 2004). But it did not 
delve into the Second Amendment’s history, as Heller 
requires. Instead, it stressed that letting felons have guns 
“would otherwise threaten the security of his fellow cit-
izens.” Id. So the concern is felons’ danger, not lack of 
virtue. 
• The same is true of the First Circuit. Citing several of 
the scholars above, that court noted that the Founders 
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sometimes spoke in terms of civic virtue. United States 
v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Reyn-
olds at 480; Shalhope at 130; Cornell, Current Crisis, at 
679; Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism, at 233; 
and the Pennsylvania minority proposal). Yet the First 
Circuit did not adopt the virtue theory itself, saying only 
that there was “an ongoing debate” on the issue that it 
did not have to resolve. Id. at 16. It also rightly under-
stood that any historical virtue limitation would rest on 
whether “a certain class of individuals would pose a se-
rious danger to the public.” Id. Again, danger is the key. 
• In upholding a ban on gun possession by those con-
victed of domestic violence, the Seventh Circuit never 
mentioned virtue. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642. And though 
it cited three sources as support for disarming criminals, 
none justifies that conclusion as a historical matter. Id. 
at 640 (citing the Pennsylvania minority proposal;  
Marshall at 700–13; and Stephen P. Halbrook, The 
Founders’ Second Amendment 273 (2008) (asserting 
that New Hampshire’s proposal must have implicitly 
excluded criminals without citing any authority for that 
assertion)). It also argued that categorical restrictions 
are permissible because “such a recent extension [in the 
1960’s] of the disqualification to non-violent felons 
(embezzlers and tax evaders, for example) is presump-
tively constitutional, as Heller said in note 26.” Id.  
(emphasis added). But footnote 26 said nothing about 
recent extensions or nonviolent felons. All it said was 
that “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of 
firearms by felons” are “presumptively lawful.” Heller, 
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554 U.S. at 627 & n.26 (emphasis added). That is no 
support for the virtue theory. 
Another three of the opinions adopted the virtue theory, 
though in cases about violent felons or people who posed dan-
gers for reasons apart from criminal records:  
• The Seventh Circuit embraced the virtue theory (mixed 
with dangerousness) in upholding a ban on gun posses-
sion by habitual drug users, not felons. Yancey, 621 F.3d 
at 683 (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3)). The ban was 
needed, it noted, “to keep guns out of the hands of pre-
sumptively risky people” and thus “suppress[ ]  armed 
violence.” Id. at 683–84. The court analogized habitual 
drug users to felons, noting their lack of virtue and the 
greater risk that they will become violent. Id. at 684–85. 
Banning gun possession by nonviolent felons, it admit-
ted, may be “wildly overinclusive.” Id. at 685. But the 
court thought that felons as a category are more danger-
ous, so the government may forbid them to possess 
guns. Id. All that was dicta because the case involved 
habitual drug users, not nonviolent felons. 
• The Eighth Circuit likewise invoked the virtue theory to 
justify disarming felons. United States v. Bena, 664 
F.3d 1180, 1183–84 (8th Cir. 2011). It rested on the 
scholarship and ratifying conventions discussed above. 
Id. (citing Kates, Dialogue, at 146; Kates & Cramer, at 
1359 & n.120; Reynolds at 480–81; and the proposals 
of the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania minority at their 
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ratifying conventions). And because the felony it ad-
dressed was domestic violence, the Eighth Circuit had 
no occasion to consider nondangerous felons. See id. 
• Finally, the Fourth Circuit cited the virtue theory as a 
reason to disarm illegal aliens. United States v. Carpio-
Leon, 701 F.3d 974, 979–80 (4th Cir. 2012). It quoted 
Yancey and Vongxay and cited many of the articles and 
proposals discussed earlier. Id. (citing Reynolds at 480; 
Kates, Dialogue, at 143, 146; Yassky at 626; Cornell, 
Current Crisis, at 671; Cornell & DeDino at 506; and 
the Massachusetts and New Hampshire ratifying con-
ventions). But it connected the virtue rationale to the 
idea that illegal aliens, having no allegiance to our  
country, could be considered “disloyal or dangerous.” 
Id. at 980. The case was about aliens, not felons. And 
once again, the touchstone is danger. 
Of the other circuits, the Ninth Circuit was the only one to 
adopt the virtue theory as a reason to disarm all felons. 
Vongxay, 594 F.3d at 1118, cited in Maj. Op. 8, 9. Yet it rested 
on the thin scholarship above. Id. (relying on Kates, Dialogue, 
at 146; and Reynolds at 480). It also noted the ongoing histor-
ical debate, citing Marshall as to the contrary. Id. 
In short, all these articles and cases show that the virtue  
theory is flimsy. Most of the evidence dovetails with danger-
ousness. The focus on virtue rests on strained readings of co-
lonial laws and ratifying conventions perpetuated by scholars 
and courts’ citing one another’s faulty analyses. The only piece 
of historical evidence that comes close to endorsing a ban of 
all former felons is a Pennsylvania minority proposal that was 
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rejected. None of this proves that the Founders limited the  
Second Amendment right to virtuous citizens and excluded all 
felons. 
II. THE CATEGORY OF FELONIES IS MANIPULABLE AND 
LESS SERIOUS THAN IT WAS 
Disarming all felons not only ignores history, but also gives 
legislatures unfettered power over a fundamental right. Though 
felons at the Founding obviously could not have guns while 
jailed and awaiting execution, that does not tell us how to treat 
felons who serve their sentences and go free. And the label 
“felony” is too easy for legislatures and prosecutors to manip-
ulate. 
A. The felony label does not entail losing all rights 
The majority gives dispositive weight to the felony label 
because “even as the term evolved and expanded, felonies con-
tinued to reflect the category of serious crimes.” Maj. Op. 17. 
Its notion of “seriousness” rests on the harsh penalties felonies 
used to carry: death, both actual and (some would add) civil. 
See Maj. Op. 14–17. Because a felon would have been  
executed and would have lost all her rights at the time of the 
Founding, the majority implies, Folajtar must lose her Second 
Amendment rights now. 
But even before the Founding, the link between felonies 
and capital punishment was frayed. The American colonies 
curtailed England’s Bloody Code. See Stuart Banner, The 
Death Penalty: An American History 6 (2002); David Garland, 
Peculiar Institution: America’s Death Penalty in an Age of 
Abolition 115 (2010). Even crimes that were capital in theory 
20 
 
often were not in practice. The colonies carried out the death 
penalty “pretty sparingly,” and “[p]roperty crimes were, on the 
whole, not capital.” Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Pun-
ishment in American History 42 (1993). Colonial Pennsylva-
nia, for instance, on average sentenced fewer than two people 
per year to die and executed only one of those two per year. Id. 
Founding Father, law professor, and Supreme Court Justice 
James Wilson explained that even though the term “felony” 
was “very strongly connected with capital punishment,” “[a]t 
the common law, few felonies, indeed, were punished with 
death.” James Wilson, 2 The Works of James Wilson 348  
(Chicago: James DeWitt Andrews ed., 1896). 
As the death penalty became less prevalent, felonies be-
came decoupled from the common-law doctrine of civil death. 
“Civil death was a state in which a person ‘though living, was 
considered dead.’ ” Kanter, 919 F.3d at 459 (Barrett, J., dis-
senting) (quoting Harry David Saunders, Note, Civil Death—
A New Look at an Ancient Doctrine, 11 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
988, 988–89 (1970)). For felons, it was “a transitional status in 
the period between a capital sentence and its execution,” used 
to wrap up the felon’s affairs. Id. (quoting Gabriel J. Chin, The 
New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass 
Incarceration, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1789, 1797 (2012)). It extin-
guished most of a felon’s civil rights. Chin at 1790. 
Because civil death was tied to a death sentence, its mean-
ing had to change as states moved away from capital punish-
ment to imprisonment. Kanter, 919 F.3d at 459 (Barrett, J., dis-
senting). It had been limited to the time before execution, not 
designed to run for decades. Id. at 460 (citing Chin at 1797). In 
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the end, courts “settled uncomfortably on an American version 
of civil death that required explicit statutory authorization and 
deprived a felon of many, but not all, rights.” Id. And for felons 
sentenced to less than life, the courts understood their rights as 
“merely suspended during the term of the sentence.” Id. at 461 
(citing cases from the New York, California, and Virginia Su-
preme Courts). 
Thus, “[t]he obvious point that the dead enjoy no rights 
does not tell us what the founding-era generation would have 
understood about the rights of felons who lived, discharged 
their sentences, and returned to society.” Id. at 462. We would 
never say, for instance, that because the state used to execute 
felons, it may now permanently strip them of their freedom of 
speech or religion. Id. at 461–62. It makes no sense to argue 
that the historical treatment of felons about to be executed  
licenses us to strip surviving felons of their rights once they 
have paid their debts to society. We can and should continue 
restrictions based on public safety: that is protective, not puni-
tive. But it is harsh to keep stigmatizing ex-cons as “unvirtu-
ous,” as if their criminal record will forever remain an indelible 
stain. 
B. The felony label is vague and manipulable 
Most felonies today are far removed from those capital 
crimes at common law. We often see little rhyme or reason in 
which crimes are labeled felonies. For instance, a radio talk 
show host can become a felon for uttering “any obscene, inde-
cent, or profane language by means of radio communication.” 
18 U.S.C. § 1464. In New Jersey, opening a bottle of ketchup 
at the supermarket and putting it back on the shelf is a third-
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degree felony, punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment. 
See Paul H. Robinson et al., Report on Offense Grading in New 
Jersey 3 (2011) (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:40-17a, 2C:43-
6.a(3) (West 2010)). And in Pennsylvania, reading another per-
son’s email without permission is a third-degree felony, pun-
ishable by up to seven years. Paul H. Robinson et al., The Mod-
ern Irrationalities of American Criminal Codes: An Empirical 
Study of Offense Grading, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 709, 
719 & nn.44, 46 (2010) (citing 18 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 7613 
(West Supp. 2010)). 
All this goes to show that today, a felony is whatever the 
legislature says it is. The category is elastic, unbounded, and 
manipulable by legislatures and prosecutors. Prosecutors often 
persuade legislatures to add more crimes to that category to 
give themselves more plea-bargaining options and leverage. 
See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal 
Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 523–33, 536–37 (2001). In some 
states, a defendant’s Second Amendment rights might even 
hinge on how prosecutors choose to prosecute them. In Cali-
fornia, “wobbler” laws let prosecutors choose between charg-
ing a crime as a felony or a misdemeanor. Ewing v. California, 
538 U.S. 11, 16–17 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
Normally, we would not inquire too deeply into why a leg-
islature passed a criminal statute or picked a punishment. A 
felony’s sentence is “purely a matter of legislative preroga-
tive,” subject only to rational-basis review. Rummel v. Estelle, 
445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980); see Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27. 
But we defer far less when a fundamental right is at stake. 
We recognized as much in Binderup. There, the Government 
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argued that maximum sentences alone suffice to prove that de-
fendants can lose their Second Amendment rights. 836 F.3d at 
350 (opinion of Ambro, J.). The three-judge opinion rightly re-
jected that approach. Otherwise, “the Government could make 
an end-run around the Second Amendment and undermine the 
right to keep and bear arms.” Id. at 350–51. 
The Binderup three-judge opinion also recognized that we 
must not “defer blindly” to maximum possible punishments 
because “some offenses may be ‘so tame and technical as to be 
insufficient to justify the ban.’ ” 683 F.3d at 350–51 (quoting 
Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d at 113). So it is “important” to look 
at the sentence imposed on a specific defendant. Id. at 352. 
That is a truer sign of whether a particular crime is “serious” 
or “minor.” Id. 
Today, the Government proposes the same blanket rule as 
it did in Binderup, just adapted to felonies. The majority now 
takes its bait. And it tries to have its cake and eat it too, adopt-
ing a rule that is somehow supposed to be both clear and flex-
ible. It says that some felonies are so “unmoored from the bar’s 
historical underpinnings” that they might not require disarming 
a felon. Maj. Op. 28. But all we can glean is that this undefined 
exclusion is “rare” and “truly exceptional.” Maj. Op. 7 n.5, 20, 
28. That gives courts zero guidance. In practice, the exclusion 
may well prove illusory. 
Under the majority’s extreme deference to felony labels, 
much will still depend on the vagaries of states’ criminal codes. 
For example, many states treat adultery as a misdemeanor. See, 
e.g., Fla. Stat. § 798.01; N.Y. Penal Law § 255.17. In Okla-
homa, however, it is a felony punishable by up to five years’ 
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imprisonment. 21 Okla. Stat. § 872. And in Pennsylvania, adul-
tery is not even a crime. Even so, under today’s near-blanket 
rule, an Oklahoma adulterer would lose his gun rights in Penn-
sylvania, though a New York adulterer would not. The Second 
Amendment right to keep and bear arms should not hinge on 
such arbitrary, manipulable distinctions. 
Setting aside the undefined exception, the majority’s near-
categorical approach seems simple, clear, and administratively 
convenient. Yet those are the same advantages that the 
Binderup dissent advanced and the three-judge opinion and 
concurrence rejected by allowing as-applied challenges.  
Compare Maj. Op. 19–20 and Binderup, 836 F.3d at 409 
(Fuentes, J., dissenting), with id. at 353 n.5 (opinion of Ambro, 
J.) and id. at 357 n.1 (Hardiman, J., concurring).  
The majority’s near-blanket rule is also far from narrowly 
tailored. Heller mandates heightened scrutiny, not rational- 
basis review. 554 U.S. at 628 n.27. And either strict or inter-
mediate scrutiny calls for narrow tailoring, not convenient 
blanket rules. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) 
(holding that the “administrative challenges” of “providing in-
dividualized consideration” do not justify bypassing “narrow[]  
tailor[ing]”). Legislatures, we have held, must tailor gun re-
strictions to fit a proper objective: here, public safety.  
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98.  
True, legislatures may use careful rules of thumb to classify 
some felonies as dangerous. For instance, though residential 
burglary and drug dealing are not necessarily violent, they are 
dangerous because they often lead to violence. Quarles v. 
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United States, 139 S. Ct. 1872, 1879 (2019); Harmelin v. Mich-
igan, 501 U.S. 957, 1002–03 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment). Disarming burglars 
and drug dealers makes sense because their past crimes were 
inherently dangerous. But some tailoring is still essential. The 
majority errs in adopting a near-blanket rule relying on statis-
tics that lump tax fraudsters together with burglars and drug 
dealers, tarring all felons as dangerous simply because some 
are. Maj. Op. 25 (citing Kanter, 919 F.3d at 449). Even its sup-
plemental statistics say nothing about criminal records: those 
statistics fail to distinguish fraudsters who have prior records 
of violence, burglary, or drug dealing from first-time offenders 
like Folajtar. Durose at tbl. 2, cited in Maj. Op. 25. And strip-
ping a person’s fundamental rights based on projected crimes 
untethered from past dangerous actions is a risky game indeed. 
In any event, we should be wary of blessing a “wildly overin-
clusive” form of civil death for all felons, far removed from 
history or danger. Yancey, 621 F.3d at 685. 
III. RESTORING FELONS TO SOCIETY IS TIED TO  
RESTORING THEIR RIGHTS 
Finally, felons are people too. A person is not reducible to 
her worst act. Once she has paid her debt to society, she should 
have a chance to reenter the community as an equal. Restoring 
felons to our polity requires restoring their rights. 
Judges often play no role in deciding whether to restore cer-
tain rights. Because of some laws’ text or history, legislatures 
make many of the judgment calls. Take the Thirteenth Amend-
ment. It authorizes involuntary servitude as punishment for a 
crime. Or take the Fourteenth Amendment. Section Two of that 
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amendment authorizes legislatures to deprive felons of the 
vote. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54. Legislatures, not courts, must 
decide when to take away and when and how to restore these 
rights. Thus, efforts to restore voting rights are properly before 
legislatures, not us. See Felon Voting Rights, Nat’l Conf. of 
State Legis. (July 28, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/elections-and-campaigns/felon-voting-rights.aspx. 
But when the text or history of a law gives judges a role in 
protecting that right, or the law or precedent is unclear, we 
should be slow to bless permanent restrictions divorced from 
legitimate needs. That is true of the Second Amendment. The 
text does not define “the people” as “the virtuous” or “non-
felons.” Nor does its history support disarming nondangerous 
felons. On the contrary, restoring felons’ rights to keep and 
bear arms is in keeping with our history. In the colonial era, 
most punishments were temporary. Only a sliver of convicts 
were executed or exiled. Most faced short-term punishments 
like warnings, fines, or restitution. Friedman at 37–39; Edgar 
J. McManus, Law and Liberty in Early New England: Criminal 
Justice and Due Process, 1620–1692, at 167–68, 171, 173–74, 
201–10 (1993) (tabulating typical crimes and penalties in sev-
enteenth-century Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Is-
land).  
Once wrongdoers had paid their debts to society, the colo-
nists forgave them and welcomed them back into the fold. In 
Middlesex County, Massachusetts, 67 of 73 colonial criminals 
studied were reintegrated back into society in documented 
ways: they later served as militia officers, public officials, 
church elders, and the like. Eli Faber, Puritan Criminals: The 
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Economic, Social, and Intellectual Background to Crime in 
Seventeenth-Century Massachusetts, in XI Perspectives in 
American History 137–44 (Donald Fleming ed. 1978)  
(“Although [the Puritans] subjected offenders to public punish-
ments and church confessions, they did not condemn them to 
exclusion and isolation for long years to come.”).  
The Quaker colonies of the Delaware Valley, today Penn-
sylvania and western New Jersey, likewise readily readmitted 
convicts to social prominence. A study of more than a thousand 
criminal charges found that after their convictions, recidivists 
were about as likely to become church leaders and much more 
likely to hold public office than the general population. Wil-
liam M. Offutt, Jr., Of “Good Laws” and “Good Men”: Law 
and Society in the Delaware Valley, 1680–1710, at 186–91 & 
tbl. 28 (1995) (“[E]ven repetitive charges did not carry a dis-
qualifying stigma.”). That historian concluded: “Clearly, the 
criminal law touched in some way every level of this society; 
just as clearly such accusations did not ostracize the defendant 
from further participation in public life.” Id. at 186.  
In short, the colonists recognized no permanent underclass 
of ex-cons. They did not brand felons as forever “unvirtuous,” 
but forgave. We must keep that history in mind when we read 
the Second Amendment. It does not exclude felons as an un-
touchable caste. 
* * * * * 
Lisa Folajtar asks us to treat her as an equal member of  
society. Though her tax-fraud conviction affects some of her 
privileges, it does not change her right to keep and bear arms. 
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As an original matter, the Second Amendment’s touchstone is 
dangerousness. Historically, all citizens enjoyed that right un-
less they posed a danger. Because she is not dangerous, we 
should not exclude her from her Second Amendment right. 
Even under the multi-factor test, dangerousness, violence, 
and the sentence imposed are significant. Yet the majority sets 
aside almost all the factors weighed in Binderup. Instead, it  
attaches near-dispositive weight to the felony label. Histori-
cally, it is true that felons had no right to guns while they were 
jailed and awaiting execution. But that “civil death” does not 
fit long after a nondangerous felon reenters society. And most 
felonies today are far less serious than capital crimes.  
Nobody claims that Lisa Folajtar poses a danger. Because 
neither history nor precedent supports disarming her for tax 
fraud, I respectfully dissent.  
